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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA,1 : Case No. 940758-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) , whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
U.S. Const. amend. V 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
Utah R. Evid. 402 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1302 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
1. Rogelio Leyva Limonta is an incorrect reference. The 
correct name is Rogelio Limonta Leyva. (R 206). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in not holding that under the 
totality of the circumstances, Mr. Leyva's statements were obtained 
illegally and should have been excluded from the jury? 
a. When an officer fails to give Miranda warnings and 
improperly elicits incriminating statements from a defendant who has 
been arrested, handcuffed, and searched, does the initial police 
illegality taint subsequently elicited "Miranda-ized" statements 
which are similar to those already "out of the bag"? 
b. When a defendant is asked if he understands the 
Miranda warnings and he says, "I don't know", must statements 
elicited thereafter be suppressed if the officer failed to both 
properly clarify such a response and obtain a valid waiver? 
Our review of the Miranda issue is non-deferential 
because this court stands in the same position as the 
trial court in reviewing the transcript of an 
interrogation. When a trial court bases its "ultimate 
conclusions concerning the waiver of defendant's 
Miranda rights, . . . upon essentially undisputed 
facts, in particular the transcript of [an officer's] 
colloquy with defendant," its conclusions present 
questions of law which we review under a correction of 
error standard. 
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State 
v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 
L.Ed.2d 507 (1992)). 
2. Did the court err in limiting the defense's cross-
examination of the State's only witness [Trooper Wassmer] and in 
excluding evidence which cast doubt on the officer's testimony? See 
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State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (the standard used for 
the admission of evidence is analogized to a pasture which, while 
involving considerable discretionary boundaries, ultimately presents 
a question of law). 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
Although case law has addressed to some extent circumstances 
involving pre-Miranda violations, the clarification responsibilities 
of an officer who receives an equivocal responses to Miranda 
warnings, and the need for a clear and informed waiver of rights, the 
case at bar combines all such circumstances in a manner which 
warrants discussion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
failing to respond to officer's signal to stop, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5. (R 147, 153). 
On August 23, 1994, a preliminary hearing was held on the matter. 
(R 170). On September 26, 1994, Mr. Rogelio Limonta Leyva moved to 
suppress evidence stemming from police misconduct, (R 205), and had 
his motion denied on October 11, 1994. (R 63-66; 244-48) . On 
October 12, 1994, a jury convicted Mr. Leyva of the above offense. 
(R 147). 
On November 18, 1994, the court sentenced Mr. Rogelio Leyva 
to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in prison, together 
with a recoupment fee of $1,000. (R 153). The sentence began 
forthwith and ran consecutively with other terms already imposed. 
(R 153) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 9:00 p.m., July 24, 1994, highway trooper 
John Wassmer was driving his patrol car "southbound on 1-15 in the 
4500 South area." (R 289-90). Trooper Wassmer noticed ahead of him 
on the highway a yellow vehicle which "was sagging badly to one 
side." (R 292). But see (R 340-41) (Gary Sebring, a friend of 
Rogelio Leyva, noticed no sagging of the car or problems with the 
suspension). Trooper Wassmer contacted dispatch and requested a 
registration check of the targeted vehicle's license plate. (R 177, 
209). The license plate apparently belonged to a Buick. (R 177, 
210) . 
Trooper Wassmer drove up beside the vehicle and observed 
the driver, "a black man driving an old yellow car" (R 184, 325). 
Wassmer also determined that the car was an Oldsmobile. (R 210). 
Trooper Wassmer turned on the overhead red and blue strobe lights 
and began to follow the Oldsmobile. (R 178, 211). Trooper Wassmer 
claimed that the car "increased its speed from 55 miles an hour to 
75 miles an hour, plus, and started passing cars." (R 179). 
The highway patrol has a "high speed chase policy" which 
requires the officer to balance the value of the suspected crime 
against the potential danger involved in the chase. (R 326-27). In 
order to further his investigation of the alleged class C 
misdemeanor charge (the suspected license plate violation), Trooper 
Wassmer asserted that it was necessary to engage in the high speed 
chase. (R 327). Wassmer also thought that the Oldsmobile had a 
problem with its suspension, a suspected class C misdemeanor 
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offense, which, in the officer's mind, set forth another basis for a 
dangerous pursuit. (R 325-27). 
Trooper Wassmer claimed to have pursued the suspected 
misdemeanant by turning on the police siren, and informing dispatch 
of his actions. (R 212). Trooper Wassmer's story was that the 
vehicle "was just jamming his way through the traffic, making people 
take evasive type action, and at one point at 7200 South we started 
down the offramp and then he cut back across the gore area there, 
the painted island, and back on to the freeway. He passed in the 
emergency lane when all the lanes were occupied, much faster than 
the traffic flow." (R 212). Despite the apparent high number of 
involved persons, Trooper Wassmer was the only prosecution witness 
brought forth to testify on the State's behalf. (R 289-339). 
Wassmer alleged that the high speed chase reached speeds 
well over 70 miles an hour. However, the trooper also testified 
that at such purported high speeds he was at "a safe following 
distance [,] [which was a few car lengths back,] . . . a second and a 
half to two seconds behind which is considered a safe following 
distance." (R 327). Wassmer said the pursuit ended "[w]hen [the 
yellow Oldsmobile] went off the 90th South offramp, he again passed 
a vehicle on the right in the emergency lane, and he was going way 
too fast to take the turn at the bottom of the ramp, and he crashed 
into the island." (R 213). 
The driver, Mr. Rogelio Leyva, remained seated in the 
vehicle and put his hands in the air. (R 180, 213-14) . Trooper 
Wassmer drew his gun and approached. (R 189; 214). A plain clothed 
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officer, who had arrived on the scene, also approached the 
Oldsmobile. (R 189). Trooper Wassmer arrested, handcuffed, and 
searched Mr. Limonta Leyva. (R 214, 298). He was placed in 
Wassmer's patrol car. (R 215). The officers soon arrived on the 
scene. (R 189, 222). 
Without advising Mr. Leyva of his Miranda rights, Trooper 
Wassmer began questioning him with, "Why'd you run." (R 191, 224, 
279). The reported response was "Plates on the wrong car". 
(R 191). During the same pre-Miranda conversation, Wassmer said 
Leyva admitted to being out on probation. (R 192, 224). Before 
Miranda warnings were given, Trooper Wassmer further inquired about 
an alleged controlled substance (cocaine) found at the scene. 
(R 192) (Wassmer "went and sat in the [police] vehicle and asked him 
[Leyva] specifically about it"). The cocaine was discovered at 
approximately x[t]en minutes after the chase began, at 18 minutes 
after 9:00 [.]" (R 190) . 
After the initial pre-Miranda discussion, "sometime later 
when I [Trooper Wassmer] intended to do formal questioning[,]" 
Wassmer decided to advise Mr. Limonta Leyva of his Miranda rights. 
(R 192, 215). The time was 21:35 hours, about one half hour after 
the actual time of the arrest. (R 215. 223). The pre-Miranda 
discussion led Trooper Wassmer to repeat his questioning, this time 
after administering the Miranda warnings. 
Following Trooper Wassmer7s reading of the Miranda 
warnings, he asked Mr. Leyva if he understood them. He said yes. 
(R 216). Trooper Wassmer then asked if he wanted to talk to us 
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now. (R 193-94, 216). Having already made pre-Miranda statements 
to the officer, Mr. Leyva responded, "I don't know." (R 193, 216). 
"I [Trooper Wassmer] informed him [Mr. Leyva] in plain language that 
he didn't have to talk to me if he didn't want to, it was up to 
him. And he nodded." (R 193, 217). 
"I [Trooper Wassmer] considered that a waiver, that he 
wanted to talk to me at that point, so I asked him [questions.]" 
(R 217). The questioning again included, "So why did you run?" 
(R 217). Mr. Leyva responded, "The plate's on the wrong car" and 
that he's "out past time", made in reference to probation. (R 217, 
225). Wassmer also asked about the cocaine, to which Mr. Leyva 
denied having any knowledge. (R 217-19, 225). 
At the motion to suppress proceeding, held in regards to 
"all statements given to the police officers at or after the time of 
arrest [,]" (R 23-24, 245); see also (Addendum B); the State 
expressed its intention of not "bringing out out any of that 
conversation before Miranda." (R 231). However, the State still 
sought to introduce the post-Miranda discussion which essentially 
repeated the pre-Miranda questions and answers. (R 217-19). In its 
ruling, the court sided with the State: 
The state has the burden of showing at least by a 
preponderance, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, that the defendant voluntarily, 
knowingly waived his right to remain silent 
post-Miranda[.] This determination may be based upon 
the defendant's words and actions. 
Here the defendant unequivocally waived his right 
to remain silent by demonstrating his assent to answer 
questions by nodding his head up and down and 
answering the officer's questions without any 
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"arguably equivocal" invocation of his right to 
silence. 
After the officer sought to clarify the "I don't 
know" response of the defendant, the further statement 
of the officer at that point in time was simply, in 
this Court's view, an effort to clarify his "I don't 
know" response. 
The motion to suppress statements made after the 
Miranda warning, therefore, is denied. 
The defendant's motion in limine regarding the 
statement "out past time" however, in this Court's 
view, ought to be and is therefore granted. The 
statement infers that the defendant was on probation 
or parole at the time of the arrest, but its probative 
value is questionable, and in this Court's view, it's 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice[.] Accordingly, this Court will limit that 
statement from trial in this matter. 
This Court is persuaded that the defendant's 
statements were voluntarily and knowingly given 
without coercion or improper conduct on the part of 
the arresting officer. 
(R 246-48) (citations omitted). 
At trial,2 Mr. Leyva attempted to impeach Trooper Wassmer's 
credibility by revealing that he failed to give Miranda warnings and 
improperly elicited incriminating statements from Mr. Leyva. 
(R 3 06). The trial court, though, refused to allow such cross 
examination. "I've ruled that pre-Miranda statements were not 
admissible, and now to attempt to show the officer omitted these 
statements from his report, while probative as bearing upon his 
credibility, is substantially outweighed, in my view, by the danger 
of misleading or confusing the jury. Therefore, the questioning 
2. Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charge dealing 
with possession of cocaine due to problems with the chain of custody. 
(R 172) . 
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about the claimed omission of the pre-Miranda statements from the 
officer's statements is disallowed[.]" (R 315-16). Mr. Leyva 
appeals the trial court's rulings. See Addendum C. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court, the State, and Mr. Rogelio Leyva all agree 
that when Trooper Wassmer first questioned Mr. Leyva while he was in 
custody, the officer had not yet administered Miranda warnings. The 
initial police illegality appropriately required suppression of the 
pre-Miranda discussion. Still in dispute, however, is whether the 
State established both that Mr. Leyva had understood his Miranda 
rights and that he also voluntarily waived them. The State showed 
only an understanding; it did not prove a voluntary waiver. Without 
a waiver, a key circumstance distinguishing Mr. Leyva's situation 
from other case law, all of Rogelio's statements to Trooper Wassmer 
should have been suppressed. 
The trial court similarly erred in not allowing Mr. Leyva 
to cross-examine Trooper Wassmer about the initial police illegality 
and about omitting such violations from his police report. While 
the court acknowledged that such evidence did in fact bear upon 
Trooper Wassmer's credibility, it erred in preventing Mr. Leyva from 
using such impeachment material to attack the officer's credibility 
and the substance of his testimony. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING IMPROPERLY ELICITED 
STATEMENTS WHICH FOLLOWED TROOPER WASSMERfS 
PRE-MIRANDA VIOLATIONS AND THE OFFICERS FAILURE TO 
BOTH CLARIFY AN EQUIVOCAL RESPONSE AND OBTAIN A PROPER 
WAIVER 
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself, . . ." U.S. Const, amend. V; accord 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. "[T]he prosecution may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from 
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the 
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination." State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968, 971 
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 
(1966)) . "[T]hese safeguards 'come into play whenever a person in 
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional 
equivalent.7" Hayes, 860 P.2d at 971 (quoting Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980)). 
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute that 
Mr. Rogelio Leyva was in custody. (R 190, 196-97, 231-32) . 
Following the claimed chase and crash, (R 213), Trooper Wassmer drew 
his gun and aimed it at the driver as he approached the Oldsmobile. 
(R 189). A plain clothed policeman also was present and back-up 
officers soon arrived at the scene. (R 189, 214, 298). Mr. Leyva 
put his hands in the air and offered no resistance. (R 180). He 
was immediately arrested, handcuffed, and searched by Trooper 
Wassmer. (R 180) ("I [Trooper Wassmer] handcuffed him and took him 
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out of the car and searched him and then placed him in my vehicle"). 
The manner in which Mr. Leyva's subsequent statements were 
elicited remains in question, however, because Miranda warnings were 
not initially given and after Miranda warnings were finally 
conveyed, there still existed problems with the waiver. 
According to the court, "Proper Miranda warnings were 
administered to the defendant by Trooper Wassmer[,]" (R 65) 
(Conclusion of Law No. 3); "The defendant understood his Miranda 
rights[,]" (R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 4); and "The defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
before questioning ensued." (R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 5). The 
court's rulings are in error. 
"A waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from a 
defendant's 'actions and words,' and is based on the 'totality of 
the circumstances.'" State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940-41 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). The court below, however, failed to properly 
incorporate all of the involved circumstances. (R 63-65). 
Important circumstances include the initial police illegality; the 
extent to which the taint of the initial illegality affected the 
waiver of the Miranda warnings; whether the Miranda warnings were in 
fact waived; and the officer's failure to properly clarify 
Mr. Leyva's remarks. 
A. STATEMENTS ELICITED BY AN OFFICER WHO FAILS 
TO GIVE MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE TAINTED AND 
CANNOT BE RE-ELICITED ABSENT PROOF OF A 
VOLUNTARY AND ATTENUATED WAIVER 
"One of the factors that can vitiate the voluntariness of a 
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subsequent confession is the hopeless feeling of an accused that he 
has nothing to lose by repeating his confession[.]" Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 325 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The 
general rule incorporates the use of the following metaphor: 
after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag 
by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is 
never thereafter free of the psychological and 
practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can 
never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out 
for good. In such a sense, a later confession may 
always be looked upon as fruit of the first. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 
532, 540 (1947)); accord State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992) 
(said another way, "First, the court must determine 'voluntariness,' 
i.e. whether the confession was voluntary; second, the court must 
determine 'attenuation,7 i.e. whether the confession was obtained in 
the course of police exploitation of the prior illegality, . . . " ) ; 
see infra note 5. 
In the case at bar, Trooper Wassmer's pre-Miranda 
interrogation caused Rogelio Limonta Leyva to let the cat out of the 
bag. (R 191, 224, 279). " [H]aving already 'let the cat out of the 
bag', a subsequent Miranda warning has little significance." State 
v. Lavaris, 664 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Wash. 1983). 
As a practical matter, Miranda warnings are of little 
use to a person who has already confessed. A person 
in this position is likely to think "[w]hat use is a 
lawyer? What good is a lawyer now? What benefit can 
a lawyer tell me? I've already told the police 
everything?" 
Lavaris, 664 P.2d at 1239 (citation omitted). 
In Lavaris, the defendant confessed to a murder during an 
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initial police interview. The detectives, however, had not yet 
given Miranda warnings to Lavaris. 664 P.2d at 1236. Approximately 
45 minutes later after the police had finally advised Lavaris of his 
Miranda warnings,3 Lavaris "gave a detailed account of his 
participation in the murder." Id. The trial court suppressed 
Lavaris' pre-Miranda statements, but it "admitted all statements 
made by [Lavaris] after he had been informed of his Miranda 
rights." Id. at 1237. 
On appeal, the Washington supreme court reversed. The 
post-Miranda statements were inadmissible as well. 
once a criminal defendant has let the "cat out of the 
bag", the subsequent giving of Miranda warnings alone 
will not erase the taint inherently associated with 
the pre-Miranda confession. Absent some kind of 
insulating factor to separate the two confessions, the 
second confession is as inadmissible as the first. 
Lavaris, 664 P.2d at 1235. Since there was no break in the 
causative chain between the pre-Miranda and post-Miranda confessions 
and the defendant did not know that earlier statements made prior to 
the Miranda warnings could not be used against him, "the second 
confession suffered from the same infirmity as the first." l^d. at 
1238. "Having let the 'cat out of the bag', the psychological 
damage was done; the subsequent Miranda warnings could not undo that 
damage." ^d. at 1239; accord State v. Erho, 463 P.2d 779 (Wash. 
3. Prior to the first police interview, "the detectives 
had already determined [Lavaris] could speak and understand 
English." Lavaris, 664 P.2d at 1236. Nevertheless, they requested 
a bilingual officer who, approximately 45 minutes after the first 
police interview, finally advised Lavaris of his Miranda rights in 
both Spanish and English. Id. 
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1970); cf. infra Point I.B. 
Lavaris has since been cited by Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298, 310 n.2 (1985), although the court there reached a contrary 
conclusion and it cautioned that such metaphors should not be used 
out of context. Ld. at 3 04, 318. Elstad is not controlling here, 
however, because of the limited nature of its holding and the 
differences in the circumstances.4 
In Elstad, investigating officers were interviewing Michael 
Elstad for his suspected involvement in a burglary. During the 
questioning, an officer "told Mr. Elstad that I felt he was involved 
in that and he looked at me and stated, 'Yes, I was there.'" 470 
U.S. at 3 02. The officers took Elstad to police headquarters and 
then for the first time advised Elstad of his Miranda rights. Id. 
The reverse side of the [Miranda] card carried three 
questions in boldface and recorded Elstad7s responses: 
"DO YOU UNDERSTAND THESE RIGHTS? 'Yeh' 
"DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS? 'No' 
"HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK 
TO US NOW? 'Yeh I do! ' " 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 315 n.4. Elstad gave a full statement of his 
involvement, which was typed and read back by the officers, and then 
4. Cf. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291 (Utah 1992) (Elstad's 
limited holding and its factual limitation would be inapplicable 
considerations under the following standard -- which accords and 
combines the law applicable to the totality of Mr. Leyva's 
circumstances -- "First, the court must determine 'voluntariness,' 
i.e. whether the confession was voluntary; second, the court must 
determine 'attenuation,' i.e. whether the confession was obtained in 
the course of police exploitation of the prior illegality, . . . " ) . 
As discussed above, Mr. Leyva's confession was involuntary because 
of the manner in which it was obtained, particularly the initial 
police illegality and the lack of an appropriate waiver. 
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signed by Elstad. Jd. at 301-02. 
At trial, Elstad attempted to suppress all of his oral and 
written statements. The trial judge suppressed his pre-Miranda 
statements although it allowed his post-Miranda confession. Jd. at 
3 02. On appeal, the Oregon court of appeals reversed whereupon the 
United States supreme court "granted certiorari to consider the 
question whether the Self-incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment requires the suppression of a confession, made after 
proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because 
the police had obtained an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission 
from the defendant." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303 (emphasis added). The 
court held: 
When police ask questions of a suspect in custody 
without administering the required warnings, Miranda 
dictates that the answers received be presumed 
compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at 
trial in the State's case in chief. The Court has 
carefully adhered to this principle . . . [although] 
[n]o further purpose is served by imputing "taint" to 
subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary 
and knowing waiver. We hold today that a suspect who 
has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive 
questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his 
rights and confessing after he has been given the 
requisite Miranda warnings. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317-18 (emphasis added). 
As in Elstad, the case at bar leaves no question that the 
pre-Miranda statements elicited by the officers should be suppressed. 
470 U.S. at 310, 318. Before any Miranda warnings were 
administered, Trooper Wassmer asked Rogelio Leyva, "Why'd you run?" 
(R 191, 224, 279). Rogelio responded, "Plates on the wrong car". 
(R 191) . During the same pre-Miranda interrogation, Mr. Leyva also 
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acknowledged that he was out on probation. (R 192, 224). Trooper 
Wassmer further inquired about cocaine found at the scene. (R 192) 
(Wassmer "went and sat in the [police] vehicle and asked him [Leyva] 
specifically about it"). Since Miranda warning were never given, 
the trial court properly excluded the pre-Miranda discussion. 
(R 314) (the lower court "ruled that the questioning before the 
Miranda warning was excluded originally . . . because the State 
agreed not to introduce such statements and because eliciting 
inculpatory statements prior to giving Miranda are properly 
excludable"); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. 
But, unlike in Elstad which contained no issue about 
whether the defendant had understood his rights or whether he did in 
fact desire to speak with officers, 470 U.S. at 301, 315 n.4, the 
"totality of the circumstances" for Rogelio Leyva cannot ignore such 
issues. Instead, the circumstances surrounding the initial police 
illegality and the additional circumstances involving the ensuing 
questions (by Trooper Wassmer) and answers (by Rogelio Leyva) must 
all be considered together in determining whether Mr. Leyva did in 
fact "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights before questioning ensued." (R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 
5); see infra Point I.B; cf. State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1017 
(Utah 1993) ("defendant [James] suddenly and impulsively confessed 
his crime when asked about his employment[,]" whereas the 
inculpatory statements elicited here resulted from Trooper Wassmer's 
specific focus on the alleged offense and were followed by 
clarification and waiver problems). 
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B. WHEN A DEFENDANT RESPONDS EQUIVOCALLY TO THE 
MIRANDA WARNINGS, THE OFFICER MUST BOTH 
CLARIFY HIS RESPONSE AND VERIFY HIS 
UNDERSTANDING AS TO WHETHER HE IS STILL 
WILLING TO WAIVE THOSE RIGHTS 
In addition to the above circumstance, see supra Point 
I.A., another factor vitiating the voluntariness of a subsequent 
confession is a defendant's equivocal response to an officer's 
reading of the Miranda warnings. See State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 
1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), 
cert, denied, U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992); 
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Sampson, after the police had read Miranda warnings to 
defendant Sampson, the following exchange occurred: 
[Detective]: Okay, having these rights in mind do you 
wish to talk to me now. 
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I mean, 
well, I'm really not worried about anything, it is 
just that . . . 
[Detective]: Okay, if you are not worried about 
anything I would say that is fine, let's go ahead and 
proceed. Let's get -this thing done and get it over 
with and see what we can do. 
Sampson: I'm willing to get it over with. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1102; see also id. ("Defendant then read and 
signed a form listing his Miranda rights and indicating his 
willingness to take the polygraph test"). 
In response to defendant Sampson's motion to suppress, "the 
trial court found, that defendant's statement, 'Well, ah, should I 
have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything, 
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it is just that . . .' did not qualify as even an equivocal request 
for counsel which the police had to be concerned about." Sampson, 
808 P.2d at 1108. On appeal, this Court disagreed with the lower 
court's conclusion. 
Finding defendant Sampson's statement "an equivocal request 
for counsel [,]" id. at 1111, this Court held that "it was necessary 
that someone clarify that equivocal request before defendant could 
be subjected to custodial interrogation. Defendant's request was 
never clarified and, consequently, the state failed to demonstrate a 
valid waiver of defendant's right to counsel." Id.5 
"The fact that defendant continued to answer questions was 
not a sufficient indication that he was abandoning his right to 
counsel." ^d. at 1111. Sampson's "subsequent statement that he was 
'willing to get it over with' was [not] sufficient to clarify his 
position and to demonstrate a waiver of his right to counsel." Id. 
at 1110. 
5. The Sampson opinion initially noted "that, though a 
defendant may waive his rights to remain silent and to have an 
attorney present during custodial interrogation, 'these waivers must 
be both intentional and made with full knowledge of the 
consequences, and the defendant is given the benefit of every 
reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'" State v. Sampson, 
808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah App. 1990). Such a waiver is consistent 
with the need for intervening factors, see Point I.B., as well as 
the exception to the general rule quoted above. See supra 
Point I.A. (Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985) (quoting 
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947)); Elstad, 470 U.S. 
at 312 ("this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a 
confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually 
disables the confessor from making a usable one after those 
conditions have been remove"). 
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Similarly, in Mr. Leyva's case, there existed insufficient 
clarification and an inadequate waiver of his Miranda rights. 
Together with the continuing effect of the pre-Miranda violation, 
see supra Point I.A., after the Miranda warnings were finally given, 
"Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer questions. 
The defendant stated 'I don't know.'" (R 64) (Finding of Fact 
No. 11). This exchange closely resembles the Sampson discussion. 
[Detective]: Okay, having these rights in mind do you 
wish to talk to me now. 
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a lawyer, I mean, 
well, I'm really not worried about anything, it is 
just that . . . 
Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1102. 
The next series of statements share additional 
similarities. "Trooper Wassmer said 'You don't have to answer 
questions if you don't want to. It's up to you.' The defendant 
nodded his head in an affirmative manner." (R 64) (Finding of Fact 
No. 11) . The defendant in Sampson also responded affirmatively to 
the officer's assurances: 
[Detective]: Okay, if you are not worried about 
anything I would say that is fine, let's go ahead and 
proceed. Let's get this thing done and get it over 
with and see what we can do. 
Sampson: I'm willing to get it over with. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1102. 
Unlike in Sampson where the defendant was at least afforded 
further time for pause and reflection in order to sign a written 
waiver, see id. ("[Sampson] then read and signed a form listing his 
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Miranda rights and indicating his willingness to take the polygraph 
test"), in Mr. Leyva's case, Trooper Wassmer proceeded immediately 
with requestioning without even obtaining anything in writing. 
(R 217) ("I [Trooper Wassmer] considered that a waiver, that he 
wanted to talk to me at that point, so I asked him [the 
questions.]"). If the expressed willingness and signed waiver in 
Sampson was held to be insufficient, the mere nodding of the head 
here should likewise be deemed inadequate. 
"[T]he state has a heavy burden to establish both that a 
defendant understood his Miranda rights and that he voluntarily 
waived them." State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah App. 
1990). At best, Trooper Wassmer's brief exchange with Mr. Leyva 
established only an understanding that "It's up to you." The 
accompanying requirement, however, of a voluntary waiver of the 
Miranda rights was not established. See id. at 1108 (quoting State 
v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 
1044 (1988) ("these waivers must be both intentional and made with 
full knowledge of the consequences, and the defendant is given the 
benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a waiver")); 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (the individual must both "waive these 
rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement"). 
As in Sampson, the officer here failed to sufficiently 
clarify both Mr. Leyva's understanding and his waiver of the Miranda 
rights. Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1108; see also id. at 1111 ("it was 
necessary that someone clarify that equivocal request before 
defendant could be subjected to custodial interrogation"); i_d. at 
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1110 (Sampson's "subsequent statement that he was 'willing to get it 
over with' was [not] sufficient to clarify his position and to 
demonstrate a waiver of his right to counsel"); Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298 (1985) (Elstad lacked the clarification and waiver 
concerns present in the case at bar, particularly Mr. Leyva's 
equivocal response, "I don't know", made in reference to the 
officer's reading of the Miranda rights); Miranda, 384 U.S. 475 
("Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible"). 
State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993), followed 
the principles in Sampson and reasserted the importance of 
clarification. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 901 ("we hold that the 
clarification approach adopted by Utah courts for evaluating 
equivocal invocation of the right to counsel applies equally in the 
context of equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent"). 
Key facts from Gutierrez include the following: 
After informing defendant [Lana Marie Gutierrez] of 
her Miranda rights, the detectives asked her if she 
understood those rights. Defendant answered, "Yes, I 
do." Detective Potter then asked her if she were 
willing to talk to them without consulting an attorney 
or having an attorney present. Defendant responded, 
"Yes. Everything's cool." 
During the interrogation, defendant denied having 
an altercation with the victim. . . . When Detective 
Potter challenged the truthfulness of this statement, 
defendant repeatedly denied that she was lying and 
then retorted, "I ain't got to listen to you, okay." 
Detective Potter answered, "No, you don't." 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added by the court). The 
interrogation continued, with Gutierrez uttering another equivocal 
response which was followed by the detective's assurances: 
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[Detective]: Well . . . we know what happened. If 
you want to tell us what happened and . . . get this 
thing . . . . 
Defendant: You think what you want to think. I ain't 
got to say nothin'. 
[Detective]: You don't have to. 
Defendant: That's right. I . . . do you know what? 
You think what you want to think 
[Detective]: Well . . . we know and ya know, you're 
not helping yourself is what we're saying. If you 
want to help yourself . . . great. Ya know. 
Defendant: Well, okay . . . I did it. But, he 
started hittin' me and shit, so I hit him back. 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (emphasis added by the court). 
Gutierrez moved to suppress her incriminating statements 
and the trial court denied the motion. 3[d. This Court reversed. 
"Having determined that defendant's incriminating statements 
followed an 'arguably equivocal' invocation of this right, we 
reverse defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial." Id. 
896-97. Importantly, the officer's response, "You don't have to" 
failed to sufficiently clarify Ms. Gutierrez's equivocal remarks: 
Because defendant's remark, "I ain't got to say 
nothin," constituted an "arguably equivocal" 
invocation of her right to terminate questioning, the 
officers interrogating her were required to clarify 
this statement. The transcript of the interrogation 
shows that the officers instead responded, "You don't 
have to," and then continued their interrogation. 
Although this response indicates an acknowledgement of 
a right to remain silent, it did not serve to clarify 
defendant's intent in making this remark. As a 
result, defendant's ensuing confession was obtained in 
violation of her fifth amendment rights and the trial 
court erred in allowing its admission into evidence. 
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Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 902. 
Trooper Wassmer's responses similarly indicated nothing 
more than a mere acknowledgement of Mr. Leyva's Miranda rights. 
When "Trooper Wassmer asked [Rogelio] if he would answer 
questions [,]" Mr. Leyva's responded equivocally: "I don't know". 
(R 64) (Finding of Fact No. 11). Like the acknowledgement in 
Gutierrez, "Trooper Wassmer said 'You don't have to answer questions 
if you don't want to. It's up to you.'" (R 64) (Finding of Fact 
No. 11); cf. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (the detectives assured 
Gutierrez, "No, you don't [have to listen]" and "You don't have to 
[say anything]"). As in Gutierrez,6 however, the officer's 
acknowledgement did not serve to clarify Mr. Leyva's intent in 
making the remark. 864 P.2d at 902. A mere nodding of the head was 
not an appropriate clarification. See id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 
(emphasis added) (individual must both "waive these rights and agree 
to answer questions or make a statement"); 384 U.S. at 470 (citation 
omitted) ("We cannot penalize a defendant who, not understanding his 
constitutional rights, does not make the formal request and by such 
failure demonstrates his helplessness"). 
Moreover, another circumstance absent from Gutierrez but 
present in the case at bar was the officer's failure to initially 
6. In Gutierrez and in the case at bar, the officers 
already possessed some leverage or knowledge about the offense prior 
to the confession. Compare Gutierrez, 864 P.2d at 897 (wherein the 
detectives proclaimed, "Well . . . we know what happened. If you 
want to tell us what happened . . . " ) , with (R 217-19) (in 
Mr. Leyva's case, Trooper Wassmer's improper pre-Miranda 
interrogation already had caused Rogelio to let the "cat out of the 
bag.") . 
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give Miranda warnings to Mr. Leyva. (R 314). By comparison, in 
Gutierrez, Miranda warnings were not only initially administered, 
there was no doubt that Ms. Gutierrez had understood them. See 864 
P.2d at 897 (when asked if she understood the rights, she answered, 
"Yes, I do[,]" and when asked if she was willing to talk to the 
police without an attorney, she responded, ffYes[,] Everything's 
cool"). 
The principles underlying State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 
1103 (Utah App. 1990), and State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah 
App. 1993), together with the circumstances surrounding Trooper 
Wassmer's initial illegality, see supra Point I.A., should govern 
the case at bar. By contrast, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. , 
129 L.Ed.2d 362, 368, 114 S.Ct. (1994), is distinguishable from 
Mr. Leyva's situation. 
In Davis, naval investigative services (NIS) interviewed 
petitioner Davis about his suspected involvement in a murder. The 
factual background is important: 
As required by military law, the [NIS] agents advised 
[Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he 
was not required to make a statement, that any 
statement could be used against him at a trial by 
court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with 
an attorney and have an attorney present during 
questioning. [Davis] waived his rights to remain 
silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing. 
About an hour and a half into the interview, 
[Davis] said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." [The 
NIS agents]: 
[m]ade it very clear that we're not here to violate 
his rights, that if he wants a lawyer, then we will 
stop any kind of questioning with him, that we 
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weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have 
it clarified is he asking for a lawyer or is he 
just making comment about a lawyer, and he said, 
[']No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he 
continued on, and said, 'No, I don't want a 
lawyer.'" 
Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d at 368 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
Davis moved to suppress his statements, but his motion was denied. 
On appeal to the United States supreme court, the high 
court affirmed the lower court denials. 
The courts below found that [Davis'] remark to the 
NIS agents -- "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" -- was 
not a request for counsel, and we see no reason to 
disturb that conclusion. The NIS agents therefore 
were not required to stop questioning [Davis], though 
it was entirely proper for them to clarify whether 
[Davis] in fact wanted a lawyer. 
Id. at 373. 
Importantly, the remark, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer", 
occurred after Davis already had "waived his rights to remain silent 
and to counsel, both orally and in writing." Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d at 
368. Hence, in Davis, unlike in Mr. Leyva's case, a waiver of the 
Miranda rights was a non-issue in the totality of the circumstances. 
Left intact under Davis, however, was the long-standing 
requirement of an initial and valid waiver. Id., at 370 ("If the 
suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the 
Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question 
him"). Although the Davis opinion declined to require "officers to 
cease questioning immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or 
equivocal reference to an attorney," _id. at 372, the requirements of 
properly administering and waiving Miranda rights were not forgotten: 
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the primary protection afforded suspects subject to 
custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings 
themselves. "[F]ull comprehension of the rights to 
remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient 
to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the 
interrogation process." A suspect who knowingly and 
voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having 
that right explained to him has indicated his 
willingness to deal with the police unassisted. 
Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d at 372 (citations omitted). 
While an officer may not need to cease questioning when a 
suspect makes an equivocal request for counsel, the accompanying 
requirement of a valid waiver remains in force. J^ d. Moreover, an 
equivocal response to Miranda warnings is a completely different 
issue, requiring clarification at the outset as a prerequisite to 
any questioning (versus renewed questioning, see supra Point I.A., 
or questioning following ambiguous invocations of the right to 
counsel, see Davis 129 L.Ed.2d 362). 
Here, "Trooper Wassmer asked [Rogelio Leyva] if he would 
answer questions. [Mr. Leyva] stated 'I don't know.'" (R 64) 
(Finding of Fact No. 11). "Trooper Wassmer said 'You don't have to 
answer questions if you don't want to. It's up to you.' 
[Mr. Leyva] nodded his head in an affirmative manner." (R 64) 
(Finding of Fact No. 11). "I [Trooper Wassmer] considered that a 
waiver, that he wanted to talk to me at that point, so I asked him 
[the questions.]" (R 217). 
Trooper Wassmer's wrongful assumption resulted in an 
invalid waiver. "[T]he state [did not carry its] heavy burden to 
establish both that a defendant understood his Miranda rights and 
that he voluntarily waived them." State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 
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1108 (Utah App. 1990). Nodding his head reflected only an 
understanding; there was no waiver. See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
475 (the individual must both "waive these rights and agree to 
answer questions or make a statement"); Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1108 
("though a defendant may waive his rights to remain silent and to 
have an attorney present during custodial interrogation, 'these 
waivers must be both intentional and made with full knowledge of the 
consequences, and the defendant is given the benefit of every 
reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'"); 384 U.S. 475 
("Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible"). 
In sum, the lack of waiver circumstance7 present in Rogelio 
Leyva's case distinguishes Elstad and Davis in a factual and legal 
context and the invalid waiver here provides an appropriate basis 
for maintaining the principles in Sampson and Gutierrez to the 
7. Another circumstance involves Trooper Wassmer's 
unrecorded conversation with Mr. Leyva. (R 64) (Findings of Fact 
No. 13). Over objections from Mr. Leyva, the trial court held, 
"Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded questioning of the 
defendant did not violate any of the defendant's constitutional 
rights." (R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 7). Mr. Leyva now 
acknowledges the correctness of this conclusion. See State v. 
Villarreal, 256 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 31 (Utah 1995) ("Notwithstanding 
the desirability of recording confessions, it is neither practicable 
nor possible to require contemporaneous recordings in all 
instances"); £f. id. at 3 0 ("electronic or other recording of a 
confession is a simple and inexpensive means of preserving critical 
evidence in an accurate form and should be implemented wherever 
possible"); State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Utah App. 1993) 
("Absent legislation or precedent from the Utah Supreme Court, we do 
not believe it would be appropriate to require, by judicial fiat, 
that all statements taken of a person in custody be recorded or 
transcribed"). 
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extent that they do not conflict with applicable federal 
limitations. C£. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301, 315 n.4 (no issue existed 
there as to whether the defendant understood his rights and he 
clearly wanted to speak with officers); Davis, 129 L.Ed.2d 362, 368 
(emphasis added) (the Davis officers "weren't going to pursue the 
matter [questioning] unless we have it clarified is he asking for a 
lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer, and he said, 
[']No, I'm not asking for a lawyer,' and then he continued on, and 
said, 'No, I don't want a lawyer.'"). 
Contrary to the lower court's conclusion,8 Mr. Leyva did 
not "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily [waive] his Miranda 
rights before questioning ensued." (R 65) (Conclusion of Law 
No. 5). His post-Miranda statements should have been suppressed. 
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481-82 (the Miranda decision and its 
companion cases were reversed despite the existence "of considerable 
evidence against each defendant[,]" including eyewitness 
8. A "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waiver of the 
Miranda rights entails a very probing inquiry: 
The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First, the 
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary 
in the sense that it was the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, 
or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made 
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision 
to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveals 
both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of 
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the 
Miranda rights have been waived. 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael 
C , 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). 
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identifications); see also Point II (the court's erroneous admission 
of the post-Miranda statements was compounded by its order limiting 
Mr. Leyva's cross-examination and the circumstances which would have 
fully apprised the jury of the pertinent context); State v. Thurman, 
846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) ("The principle underlying the 
exploitation test is that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law 
enforcement to 'ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining 
a consent after the illegality has occurred'"). 
POINT II 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY PREVENTED MR. LEYVA FROM 
CROSS-EXAMINING TROOPER WASSMER ABOUT FACTORS 
AFFECTING HIS CREDIBILITY, THUS LEAVING THE JURY WITH 
THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT IT HAD NO REASON TO DOUBT 
THE OFFICER1S STORY 
The lower court "ruled that the questioning before the 
Miranda warning was excluded originally . . . because the State 
agreed not to introduce such statements and because eliciting 
inculpatory statements prior to giving Miranda are properly 
excludable." (R 314); accord State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 
n. 2 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted) ("We agree that the 
questioning of defendant constituted "interrogation," defined as 
actions or words by a police officer which the officer 'should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect.'"); see supra Point I. 
However, the State still sought to introduce a post-Miranda 
discussion which essentially repeated the pre-Miranda questions and 
answers. (R 217-19). The pre-Miranda and post-Miranda discussions 
elicited inculpatory statements, references to being out on 
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probation, and innuendos regarding cocaine possession. (R 191, 
192, 217-19) . Despite the above concerns, see supra Point I, 
the court admitted "questions and answers given post-Miranda . . . 
in the trial." (R 65) (Conclusion of Law No. 6); (R 311-12) (the 
court intimated that if it admitted evidence of the officer's 
Miranda violation, it also would admit the references to probation 
and cocaine). 
Since the post-Miranda inculpatory statements were not 
excluded, at trial Mr. Leyva attempted to raise questions about the 
officer's credibility by showing what had happened before the 
Miranda warnings were finally given. (R 316) (Mr. Leyva wanted to 
ask Trooper Wassmer if he elicited incriminating questions before 
the Miranda warnings "because it establishes both that [Trooper 
Wassmer] is breaking the law and that he's also excluding that from 
his report which is supposed to be documenting this case"). The 
initial police illegality were considerations which the jury was 
entitled to consider in determining the substance of the State's 
claims. 
The court below, however, precluded Mr. Leyva from 
attacking Trooper Wassmer's credibility during cross-examination. 
(R 317). According to the court, "I've ruled that pre-Miranda 
statements were not admissible, and now to attempt to show the 
officer [Trooper Wassmer] omitted these statements from his report, 
while probative as bearing upon his credibility, is substantially 
outweighed, in my view, by the danger of misleading or confusing the 
jury." (R 316). The court's ruling was in error. 
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The right of cross-examination is an integral part 
of the right of confrontation, which is guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 12, Constitution of Utah and the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. The cross-examination of a witness, 
testifying against the accused, provides a means of 
attacking his credibility and thus the substance of 
his testimony. 
State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); Utah Const. 
art. I, § 12; U.S. Amend. VI. 
The general rule is that " [a]11 relevant evidence is 
admissible, ..." Utah R. Evid. 402. "Although relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, ..." Utah R. Evid. 403. In contrast to the 
court's ruling, without the excluded and undisputed evidence 
undermining Trooper Wassmer's credibility, the jury had no reason 
not to believe the State's lone witness. (R 289-339). The jury was 
misled into believing that Trooper Wassmer simply "did his job" and 
that there should be no questions about his testimony. See, e.g., 
(R 292-301).9 
For example, during closing argument, the State summarily 
discounted defense claims impinging Trooper Wassmer's credibility 
and it repeatedly vouched for the officer in its arguments to the 
jury: 
9. The court erroneously stated that Mr. Leyva had 
explored the full extent of Trooper Wassmer's pre-Miranda violations 
and the nature of the omissions from his police report, (R 320), 
when in fact Mr. Leyva's narrow questioning of the officer dealt 
with other issues. (R 318-20; 363-65). 
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[The State]: [Mr. Leyva] mentioned that the officer 
must simply be wrong, that it [the Oldsmobile] wasn't 
sagging because Gary Sebring earlier that day when it 
was parked didn't see it sagging. [[B]ecause there's 
somebody who earlier that day did not see a sagging 
car, somehow we should distrust the officer.] Well, I 
don't know how valid that is. 
[Mr. Leyva is] concerned that the officer didn't 
tell dispatch he was going to stop the car for a 
safety violation. Well, that wasn't his testimony. 
[Mr. Leyva] tells us it's incredible that the 
officer chased the Defendant for just a misdemeanor. 
Again, I don't see how the evidence can support that 
whatsoever. 
the officer testified he was travelling in the 
left-hand lane, but admitted at some point he went 
over to the right-hand lane. So what? Of course he 
was in the left-hand lane. Of course at some point he 
went to the right-hand lane because the Defendant was 
driving off the highway. That means that somehow you 
can't trust the officer? 
Finally, there are many mentions of lying, although 
I didn't hear Counsel specifically say this is what 
the officer was lying about. [Counsel], of course, 
intimated he was lying. I didn't hear any lies. You 
didn't hear any lies. What you heard was a 
professional, experienced officer who was doing what 
he's paid to do, to patrol the streets of this 
community on a night when every one of us were out 
holidaying and partying. He was doing his job, and 
for anyone to suggest on this evidence that he was 
lying, I say they're completely wrong. 
You heard his [Trooper Wassmer] testimony. You saw 
him testify. You saw him under cross-examination. 
You know what kind of a man he is. He did his duty. 
He did his job. 
(R 355-58) (emphasis added) 
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Due to the court's limitations on Mr. Leyva's cross-
examination, however, the jury did not really know "what kind of man 
[Trooper Wassmer] is", nor was the jury able to consider the 
undisputed Miranda violations which reflected upon how Wassmer "did 
his job." (R 358); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492 (Vignera v. New York, a 
companion case to, and explained within, the Miranda opinion noted 
that the lack of Miranda warnings required reversal and it also 
indicated the important circumstance that in Vignera's original 
trial, "The defense was precluded from making any showing that 
warnings had not been given"). "Since the trial court unduly 
restricted defendant in the exercise of his constitutional right of 
cross-examination, the review thereof is controlled by the 
constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman v. California [, 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)]." State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 
(Utah 1980); 621 P.2d at 1233 ("This standard compels reversal 
unless the reviewing court can declare a belief that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
Trooper Wassmer was the State's only witness and his 
testimony cannot be considered cumulative evidence. (R 289-339). 
The officer's testimony was the only means through which the State 
could meet its burden of proof. As defense counsel argued, 
He's [Trooper Wassmer] not bringing you any proof 
other than his own word. . . . [Wassmer] said the car 
was sagging. I don't know about that. Gary Sebring 
testified that . . . when he saw it parked, he did not 
notice any problem with the suspension[.] . . . 
[Wassmer], in talking to the dispatch operator, . . . 
described the person as simply a black man driving an 
old yellow car, didn't make any mention that he 
thought there was an equipment violation at stake. He 
never wrote a citation for an equipment violation. 
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• . . [Wassmer is] supposed to balance the safety of 
the public against the seriousness of the offense in 
order to decide whether to even engage in a high speed 
chase. . . . [W]ould an officer investigating a Class 
C misdemeanor [the sagging] . . . chase a car down 
1-15 . . . for like more than 3 0 blocks, over 70 miles 
an hour, down an off ramp, back onto the freeway --
doesn't that sound a little incredible to you? . . . 
The officer testified that this man confessed to him 
having committed a felony and he did not record it. 
. . . Why didn't he bring us that proof? . . . The 
evidence showed that the video equipment was available 
to this officer and he declined to use it. . . . I 
don't know how reliable his own word can be when you 
look at some of the suspicious areas in his testimony 
like the sagging car, like his being in the left-hand 
lane of the freeway when he was also over in the 72nd 
South exit. 
(R 350-54) . 
The improper exclusion of the evidence impeaching Trooper 
Wassmer's credibility was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"The cross-examination of a witness, testifying against the accused, 
provides a means of attacking his credibility and thus the substance 
of his testimony." Chesnut, 621 P.2d at 1233 (emphasis added); 
accord State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650 (Utah 1985) (quoting Davis v. 
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("Cross-examination is the 
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the 
truth of his testimony are tested")). State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 
(Utah 1986) ("It is elementary that the fact finder may accept all, 
part, or none of a witness's testimony"). At the very least, lesser 
included offenses10 may have been an acceptable alternative to a jury 
10. The lesser included misdemeanor offenses were 
"interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest" and 
- [footnote continued on next page]-
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who, had they been fully and properly informed, would have had 
reason to question aspects of Trooper Wassmer's testimony. State v. 
Brown, 694 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) ("questions of 
credibility and choices between differing versions of the facts 
belong properly to the jury"). Mr. Leyva's conviction should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Leyva respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction and remand for a new trial with an order suppressing the 
improperly elicited statements. 
10 - [footnote continued]-
"disobeying a peace officer or traffic controller." (R 139, 140). 
"Interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest" requires, 
inter alia, proof that Mr. Leyva knew or should have known "that a 
peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful arrest of detention of 
Mr. Leyva" and that there was interference with said arrest or 
detention by "refusal to perform any act required by lawful order 
necessary to effect the arrest or detention[.]" (R 139); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-305. "Disobeying a peace officer or traffic controller" 
requires, inter alia, proof that Mr. Leyva willfully failed or 
refused to comply with any lawful order or direction of any peace 
officer." (R 140); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13. The greater offense, 
"Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop", requires, inter 
alia, proof "[t]hat after having received a visual or audible signal 
from a police officer to bring his vehicle to a stop he either . . . 
operated his vehicle in a willful or wanton disregard of such signal 
so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or 
person . . . [or] knowingly or intentionally attempted to flee or 
elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means." (R 133); Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-13. 
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SUBMITTED this /O day of April, 1994. 
5-
RONALD S. ^FUJtENO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ELIZABETH HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 10 day of April, 1994. 
DELIVERED by 
this day of April, 1994 
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ADDENDUM A 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 41-la-1303 
41-la-1302. Violations class C misdemeanor. 
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless 
otherwise provided. 
41-la-1305. License plate and registration card violations 
— Class C misdemeanor. 
It is a class C misdemeanor 
(1) to break, injure, interfere with, or remove from any vehicle any 
seal, lock, or device on it for holding or displaying any license plate or 
registration card attached for denoting registration and identity of the 
vehicle; 
(2) to remove from any registered vehicle the license plate or registra-
tion card issued or attached to it for its registration; 
(3) to place or display any license plate or registration card upon any 
other vehicle than the one for which it was issued by the division; 
(4) to use or permit the use or display of any license plate, registration 
card, or permit upon or in the operation of any vehicle other than that for 
which it was issued; 
(5) to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by 
law to be registered without having the license plate or plates securely 
attached, and the registration card issued by the division carried in the 
vehicle, except that the registration card issued by the division to all 
trailers and semitrailers shall be carried in the towing vehicle; 
(6) for any weighmaster to knowingly make any false entry in his 
record of weights of vehicles subject to registration or to knowingly report 
to the commission or division any false information regarding the 
weights; 
(7) for any inspector, officer, agent, employee, or other person perform-
ing any of the functions required for the registration or operation of vehi-
cles subject to registration, to do, permit, cause, connive at, or permit to 
be done any act with the intent, or knowledge that the probable effect of 
the act would be to injure any person, deprive him of his property, or to 
injure or defraud the state with respect to its revenues relating to title or 
registration of vehicles; 
(8) for any person to combine or conspire with another to do, attempt to 
do, or cause or allow any of the acts in this chapter classified as a misde-
meanor; 
(9) to operate any motor vehicle with a camper mounted on it upon any 
highway without displaying a current decal in clear sight upon the rear of 
the camper, issued by the county assessor of the county in which the 
camper has situs for taxation; 
(10) to manufacture, use, display, or sell any facsimile or reproduction 
of any license plate issued by the division or any article that would ap-
pear to be a substitute for a license plate; or 
(11) to fail to return to the division any registration card, license plate 
or plates, decal, permit, or title that has been canceled, suspended, voided. 
41-6-13.5. 
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily 
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfei-
ture of vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a 
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the opera-
tion of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, 
as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than 
$1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death 
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amount-
ing to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. 
The court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of 
not less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other 
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from 
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a 
peace officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license 
revoked pursuant to Subsection 41-2-127(l)(h) [53-3-220(l)(h)] for a pe-
riod of one year. 
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward 
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the 
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court 
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the 
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not 
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division 
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state. 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic con-
trollers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order 
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law 
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are direct-
ing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest 
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways." 
76-8-305* Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use offeree or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
ADDENDUM B 
ELIZABETH HUNT #5292 
Attorney for Mr. Leyva 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Motion To Suppress 
Plaintiff, : Mr. Leyva*s Statements 
v. 
ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA, 
: Case No. 941901168FS 
Defendant. 
: Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Comes now Rogelio Limonta Leyva, by and through 
counsel, Elizabeth Hunt, and hereby moves this Court to suppress 
all statements made by him to the police. 
Prior to the admission of any statements made during 
accusatory or custodial interrogation, it is the government's 
burden to show that Mr. Leyva was informed of and waived his 
Miranda rights. Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 
1983); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The government 
must alsp demonstrate that the statements were constitutionally 
voluntary. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988). Once a 
00023 
suspect invokes the right to remain silent, officers must cease 
questioning the suspect. If there is an equivocal invocation of 
the right to remain silent, police are limited to clarifying the 
issue. Statements taken in violation of these rules are to be 
suppressed. State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894 (Utah App. 1993). 
Statements made after an illegal arrest must be excluded unless 
the government can demonstrate that the statements were untainted 
by and causally disconnected from the illegal arrest. Taylor v. 
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). 
Mr. Leyva hereby invokes his rights pursuant to the 
foregoing case law; Article I sections 7, 12 and 14 of the Utah 
Constitution; and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. Mr. Leyva formally notifies the 
government that it must meet the aforementioned burdens at the 
evidentiary hearing to be held prior to trial. 
Respectfully submitted this / y£~day of Y/L/ , 1994. 
E yL EfABETH \tUJNT 
Attorney £©r Mr. Leyva 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered/mailed a copy of this 
motion to the Deputy County Attorney this day of 
1994. J £ ^ 
^uswcwrr 
X 
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ADDENDUM C 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attomey 
ROBERT L. STOTT, Bar No. 3131 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO SUPRESS 
-vs-
) Case No. 941901168FS 
ROGELIO LEYVA LIMONTA, 
' Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on September 26,1994, to hear 
argument on the defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant was represented by his attorney, 
Elizabeth Hunt, and the State was represented by Robert L. Stott. The Court having heard 
argument and evidence presented by the parties, hereby makes the following findings 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 24,1994, at approximately 9:00 PM, Utah Highway Trooper Jon Wassmer 
was on duty and traveling in his marked Highway Patrol vehicle on 1-15 near 4500 South in Salt 
Lake County. 
2. Trooper Wassmer noticed a vehicle traveling the same direction which appeared to sag 
badly on one side. 
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3. Trooper Wassmer asked Dispatch to run the license plate number to determine its 
registration. He learned that the plate was registered to an 1984 Buick. 
4. The vehicle was, however, as Trooper Wassman could see, an Oldsmobile. 
5. Trooper Wassmer pulled in behind the vehicle and activated his overhead lights. 
6. Rather than stopping the vehicle immediately, increased its speed from 55 mph to 75 
mph and sped down the freeway. 
7. Trooper Wassmer activiated his siren and pursued the vehicle which eventually left 
the freeway at 90th South and crashed as it attempted to make a turn. 
8. The defendant was, and had been driving the car, 
9. Trooper Wassmer arrested the defendant and a few moments later, in Trooper 
Wassmer's car, advised the defendant of his Miranda rights by reading them from a standard DUI 
form. 
10. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he understood his Miranda rights. The 
defendant replied "Yes." 
11. Trooper Wassmer asked the defendant if he would answer questions. The defendant 
stated "I don't know." Trooper Wassmer said "You don't have to answer questions if you don't 
want to. It's up to you." The defendant nodded his head in an affirmative manner. 
12. Trooper Wassmer then asked, "So why did you run?" The defendant immediately 
answered, "The plates are on the wrong car." 
13. Trooper Wassmer did not record this conversation. 
WHEREFORE, having entered its Findings of Facts, the Court now makes the following 
conclusions 
OQOfi/i 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The stop and arrest of the defendant by Trooper Wassmer was based upon his 
observing traffic violations occurring in his presense: license plate violation, speeding, and 
failure to respond to an officer's signal. 
2. The defendant's arrest and stop did not violate either Utah or United States 
constitutional provisions. 
3. Proper Miranda warnings were administered to the defendant by Trooper Wassmer. 
4. The defendant understood his Miranda rights. 
5. The defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 
before questioning fasued. 
6. The questions and answers given post-Miranda are admissible in the trial. 
7. Trooper Wassmer's in the field unrecorded questioning of the defendant did not 
violate any of the defendant's constitutional rights. 
DATED this llfVday of October, 1994. 
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